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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN WELLS,

1
Plaintiff and Appellant, j

™CITY COURT OF LOGAN C I T Y ,
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF
UTAH,
Defendant and Rcs/x indent.

( Case No.
/
13824
I
j
J

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff, who is
the Defendant in a Logan City Court criminal case, for
an extraordinary writ (prohibition) under Rule 65 B(b)
(4), U. R. C. P., commanding Defendant (City Court)
to desist and refrain from any further proceedings in the
case of the State of Utah vs. John G. Wells.
DISPOSITION IN UJWIW COURT
The Court denied Plaintiff's Petition for a Writ of
Prohibition and held that the Wellsville town Justice
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Court had no jurisdiction over the misdemeanor and that
the Defendant (Logan City Court) had exclusive jurisdiction over all matters occurring in Logan City and all
unincorporated areas of Cache County.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Appellant seeks reversal of the Court's
Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Writ of Prohibition
and seeks an Order of the Supreme Court making the
Writ of Prohibition absolute.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Appellant, John G. Wells, is the Defendant in a criminal case, pending in Logan City Court,
entitled State of Utah vs. John G. Wells.
On the 16th day of March, 1974, the Plaintiff and
Appellant was arrested by an officer of the Utah Highway Patrol, at the intersection of State Road 85 and
State Road 23 approximately 1 mile from Wellsville,
Cache County, Utah. The point of arrest was approximately 5 miles from Both Hyrum, Cache County, Utah
and Mendon, Cache County, Utah. The point of arrest
was nine miles from Logan, Cache County Utah. The
Plaintiff and Appellant was charged under a Complaint
and Notice to Appear, No. K018630, with the crime of
driving under the influence of intoxicants.
There is a Justice of the Peace Court at Wellsville,
Cache County, Utah, occupied by Merrill L. Green, who
resides and has his office in said town and is admittedly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
the nearest and most accessible court (R. City Court 15).
There is a Justice of the Peace Court in Hyrum, Cache
County, Utah, occupied by LeGrand Christensen, who
maintains his home and office in said town. There is a
Justice of the Peace Court in Mendon, Cache County,
Utah, occupied by Charles R. Zarker, who maintains
his home and office in said town. There is a City Court
in Logan, Cache County, Utah (Defendant and Respondent in this appeal) (R. City Court 15).
The officer did not take the Plaintiff and Appellant
before any of said Justices of the Peace, nor to said Defendant City Court, nor before any justice of the peace
or magistrate, but took the Plaintiff and Appellant to
the Cache County Jail at Logan, Utah, where he was
booked, posted bail and ultimately released (R. City
Court 9).
Although said ticket complaint contained on it a
promise to appear, with a line for the signature of the
accused person, the Plaintiff and Appellant did not sign
said ticket complaint, but was notified to appear before
the said Defendant City Court of Logan, Utah, on the
26th day of March, 1974 (Exhibit 1 City Court).
Section 41-6-166, 7 of the Utah Code Annotated and
the Supreme Court rule adopted on January 7th, 1959
provides for the commencement of actions involving an
arrest without a warrant upon a charge of driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, by the filing of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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a ticket complaint in lieu of a formal complaint under
oath required by Section 77-57-2, Utah Code Annotated.
The highway patrol officer attempted to follow said provisions in the commencement of this action against the
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Section 41-6-166, provides as follows:
"Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this act punishable as a disdemeanor,
the arrested person shall be immediately taken
before a magistrate within the county in which
the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense
and is nearest or most accessible with reference
to the place where said arrest is made, in any
of the following cases:
1
2. When the person is arrested upon a charge
of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs.
3
Section 41-6-167, provides as follows:
"NOTICE TO APPEAR IN COURT — CONTENTS — PROMISES TO COMPLY — SIGNING — RELEASE FROM CUSTODY — OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT.
(a) Upon any violation of this act punishable
as a misdemeanor, whenever a person is immediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbefore provided, the police officer shall prepare in
triplicate or more copies of a written notice to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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appeal in court containing the name and address of such person, the number, if any, of his
operator's or chauffeur's license, the registration
number of his vehicle, the offense charged, and
the time and place when and where such person
shall appear in court.
(b) The time specified in such notice to appear
must be made before a magistrate within the
county in which the offense charged is alleged
to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of such offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
(d) The arrested person, in order to secure release as provided in this section, must give his
written promise satisfactory to the arresting officer so as to appear in court by signing at least
one copy of the written notice prepared by the
arresting officer. The officer shall deliver a copy
of such notice to the person promising to appear.
Thereupon, said officer shall forthwith release
the person arrested from custody. (Emphasis
added.)
(e) Any officer violating any of the provisions
of this section shall be guilty of misconduct in
office and shall be subject to removal from of
fice."
The Supreme Court Rule provides as follows:
"Whenever a written notice to appear has been
prepared by a police officer under the provisions
of Section 41-6-167, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
and when such notice has been delivered to the
person charged, and filed with the court, or
whenever notice of illegal parking has been given,
an exact and legible duplicate copy of such noDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tice, when filed with the court, shall, in lieu of
a verified complaint, and notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 77-57-2, Code of Criminal
Procedure, constitute a complaint to which the
defendant may plead 'guilty'.
If, however, the defendant shall violate his promise to appear in court, or shall not deposit lawful bail, or shall plead other than 'guilty' of the
offense charged, a complaint shall be filed which
shall be deemed to be an original complaint, and
thereafter proceedings shall be had as provided
by law; provided, that a defendant may, by an
agreement in writing, subscribed by him and
filed with the court, waive the filing of a verified
complaint, and elect that the prosecution may
proceed upon the written notice to appear."
Based upon an alleged wilful noncompliance with
the provisions aforesaid on the part of the arresting officer, in fact a complete and total disregard of the law,
Plaintiff and Appellant entered a special appearance and
moved the Court to dismiss the purported Complaint
and Notice to Appear in that said purported ticket complaint and the procedure followed by the officer failed
to comply with the provisions of the law, in that the
Defendant in said case (The Plaintiff and Appellant
here) had not been immediately taken before a magistrate as required by the statutory mandate of Section
41-6-166 set forth above, nor had he executed a written
promise to appear (R. City Court 7).
The argument on said motion came up for hearing
on the 19th day of April, 1974, but in the interim period
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a formal complaint was issued out of the Logan City
Court dated the 8th day of April, 1974, signed by the
said arresting officer, which Complaint, together with
a criminal summons bearing the date of the 18th day of
April, 1974, was served upon the Plaintiff and Appellant's 15 year old son at Plaintiff's home in Salt Lake
City, Utah, which said Complaint and Summons was
on the next day served on the Plaintiff personally at
his place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. City
Court 3, 5, 6).
At the hearing on said motion to dismiss on the
19th day of April, 1974, the City Court refused to grant
Plaintiff and Appellant's motion. However, the Court
recognized that the initial Complaint and Notice to Appear was defective and on May 3, 1974, entered its order
determining that the initial Complaint or ticket issued
by the highway patrolman was not a valid promise to
appear (R. City Court 11).
On the 22nd day of April, 1974, the Plaintiff and
Appellant entered a further special appearance for the
purpose of moving to dismiss all of the purported complaints pending before the City Court on the grounds
that the City Court did not have jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or that if the Court did have jurisdiction over the offense charged, it should refuse to exercise
such jurisdiction in this case (R. City Court 12).
The Second Motion to Dismiss came on before the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court on the 3rd day of May, 1974, and Plaintiff and
Appellant's Motion was denied.
Thereupon Plaintiff and Appellant filed this action
in First District Court seeking an extraordinary writ
(prohibition) to prevent the Logan City Court from
exercising jurisdiction over the criminal case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO GIVE ANY FORCE OR EFFECT WHATSOEVER TO THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 41-6-166 AND IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE NEAREST MOST
ACCESSIBLE MAGISTRATE A N D T H E
COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE
PERSON AND OFFENSE HEREIN WAS
THE W E L L S V I L L E TOWN JUSTICE
COURT.
Plaintiff and Appellant contend that under the procedure followed by the arresting officer, to-wit: a nonwarrant arrest for driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor, followed by a Ticket and Notice to
Appear, authorized solely under Section 41-6-166 and
167 and the Supreme Court Rule promulgated under
these rules, it was mandatory that the arresting officer
take him immediately before the nearest and most acDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cessible magistrate, in this case, the Wellsville Town
Justice of the Peace, and that the arresting officer by
disobeying the law, cannot remove jurisdiction from said
justice court and confer it upon the Logan City Court.
Section 41-6-166 states that whenever a person is
arrested upon a charge of driving while intoxicated "the
arrested person shall be immediately taken before a magistrate9' . . . "who has jurisdiction of such offense and
is nearest or most accessible" to the place of arrest.
77-10-4 defines a magistrate as an officer having
power to issue a warrant of arrest.
77-10-5 (4) specifies that justices of the peace are
magistrates.
As the record shows, the non-warrant arrest was
made about 1 mile from the Wellsville Justice of the
Peace. There was no nearer justice. Thus, the Wellsville
Justice of the Peace was the nearest or most accessible
magistrate.
78-5-5 gives town justices jurisdiction over the offense
charged.
This section gives town justices the same powers
and jurisdictions as other justices of the peace in all
actions, civil and criminal. In town ordinance violations,
they have exclusive jurisdiction.
78-5-4 defines the criminal jurisdiction of Justices'
Courts to include all misdemeanors punishable by a fine
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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less than $300.00 or by imprisonment not exceeding 6
months, or both. (The foregoing statutes are treated
in greater detail under Point II.)
It therefore appears clear that town justices qualify
as magistrates having juisdiction of the offense under
Section 41-6-166 and that defendant should have been
taken immediately before the Wellsville Justice. The
Mendon Justice and Hyrum Justice would have qualified
ahead of the Logan City Court. Moreover, under Utah
criminal procedure if the offense is triable by the magistrate he has full jurisdiction over the offense and the
Defendant to try and determine such offense (77-13-17).
MEANING OF "SHALL IMMEDIATELY
The term "shall immediately" and "shall" have experienced some judicial consideration. Herr vs. Salt Lake
County, (Utah August 14, 1974), 525 P. (2d) 728; State
of New Mexico vs. Slicker, (N. Mex., 1968), 448 P. (2d)
478; Fowler vs. State, (Florida), 255 So. (2d) 513.
Herr vs. Salt Lake County, involves an extremely
recent consideration by this Court fo the word "shall".
At page 729 of 525 P. (2d), this Court said:
"The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily
that of command. It is defined in the American
Heritage Dictionary as follows: 2. . . . d. Compulsion, with the force of must, in statutes,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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deeds, and other legal documents. The United
States Supreme Court distinguished between
the words may and shall in the case of Anderson v Yungdau, (1946) 329 U. S. 482, 67 S. Ct.
428, 91 L. Ed. 436 as follows.
The word shall is ordinarily language of
command. Escoe vs. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490,
493, 55 S. Ct. 818, 819, 79 L. Ed. 1566. And
when the same Rule uses both may and
shall, the normal inference is that each is
used in its usual sense — the one act being
permissive, the other mandatory."
Fowler involved a code provision in the Florida
Statute that under certain circumstances "the court
shall immediately fix a time for hearing . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
The Appellate Court said:
"The mandatory verb 'shall' makes it obligatory
on the Court to fix a time for hearing if there
are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is insane. Moreover, the mandatory
'shalT is followed by the word 'immediately'
which lends urgency and significance to the duty
of the judge to conduct the required hearing.
The framers of the rule obviously did not regard
lightly the necessity for a hearing."
The Slicker case involved the words, "shall immediately" in a warrant arrest, and the statute provided that
the arresting officer "shall immediately" take the Defendant before the Court or officer who issued the warrant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court said:
"As used in this statute, 'immediately' means
with reasonable promptness and dispatch."
If this is so on an arrest made after the issuance of
a warrant, certainly a person arrested without a warrant
is entitled to be taken before a magistrate with something
more than reasonable promptness and dispatch, and with
some urgency. (Emphasis added.)
The reason for immediate action in a case of our
type, (a charge of driving while intoxicated), seems apparent.
A comparison of the two Utah statutes emphasizes
the difference. In the ordinary non-warrant arrest, the
legislature says the Defendant shall be taken before the
magistrate "without unnecessary delay" (77-13-17). Take
a burglary charge, for instance, where the Defendant is
arrested without a warrant and the evidence consists of
a pry-bar, lock picks, mask, etc. A delay in going before
a magistrate, while prejudicial to some extent, involves
evidence of a permanent type, and is not as serious as a
situation where timely scrutiny of the evidence is essential, such as a charge of intoxication. A person accused
of being intoxicated is entitled, according to the legislature, to be immediately taken before a magistrate to determine if the officer is making a valid accusation. Intoxication, as a matter of fact, is generally temporary in
nature, based on opinions, and under the law, the officer
does not have the right to be the sole judge of the fact.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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To permit the officer to completely circumvent the plain
language of the statute is to permit him to act as the
committing magistrate and also determine what court
will have jurisdiction of the person of the party arrested.
Plaintiff and Appellant's contention is that the legislature detemiiines this, not the police officer.
To permit the City Court in this case to take jurisdiction over the Plaintiff and Appellant under the facts
of this case, and the law, is to allow the arresting officer
to completely ignore the legislative declaration and to
usurp judicial and legislative authority.
POINT II.
T H E LOWER C O U R T E R R E D IN
HOLDING THAT THE GEOGRAPHICAL
JURISDICTION OF TOWN JUSTICES IS
C O N F I N E D TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL
BOUNDARY LIMITS OF THE TOWN, AND
THAT THE CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY
IS THE EX-OFFICIO JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE FOR THE COUNTY.
The trial court ruled that in criminal non warrant
arrests the jurisdiction of the Wellsville Town Justice
did not extend beyond the Wellsville town limits, but,
that the jurisdiction of the City Court of Logan extended
to the limits of Cache County.
The Trial Court said, in its Memorandum Decision,
dated July 1, 1974:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Under 78-4-16.5 in any event the Complaint
may be commenced or the arrested person taken
to the nearest city court judge, which is in this
case the Logan City Court, for any offense that
is a misdemeanor that occurs in Cache County
under state law and need not be taken to the
nearest justice of the peace under the authority
of that newly enacted statute." (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, the District Court ruled that since the alleged misdemeanor offense did not occur within the boundaries of any town, the "nearest or most accessible" magistrate (Wellsville Magistrate one (1) mile distant), did
not have jurisdiction, and that the Logan City Court
nine (9) miles from the scene, was the precinct justice
of the peace and had jurisdiction over the person and
offense even though predicated upon a non-warrant arrest and ticket complaint.
In analyzing the statutes governing jurisdiction of
justice courts and city courts, it appears that they are
identical.
Thus, if the criminal jurisdiction of a town justice
is limited to geographical boundaries of the town, the
criminal jurisdiction of the City Court is likewise limited
to the geographical boundaries of the City.
The Court relied upon three statutory provisions in
determining that
(1) The jurisdiction of justice courts was limited
to geographical boundaries; and that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(2)
justice.

The Logan City Court is the county precinct

These statutes are:
78-5-1:
"Every justice of the peace shall reside in
and shall hold a justice's court in the precinct,
city, or town for which he is elected or appointed, provided that where two or more precincts are embraced within the limits of any incorporated city or town the justices of the peace
of such precinct may hold court at any place
within such city or town. If after reasonable
search the county commissioners are unable to
find a prospective justice of the peace residing
within a precinct needing a justice of the peace,
they may select a person residing within an adjoining precinct of the county or within the city
limits."
77-57-2:
"Other than as provided by Section 77-13-17,
proceedings and actions before a justice's court
for a misdemeanor offense must be commenced
by complaint under oath, setting forth the offense charged, with such particulars of time,
place, person and property as to enable the defendant to understand distinctly the character
of the offense complained of and to answer the
complaint. The complaint shall be commenced
becfore a magistrate within the precinct of the
county or city in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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78-4-16.5:
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced
before a magistrate under Section 77-57-2, or an
arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate under Section 77-13-17, the complaint may
be commenced or the arrested person may be
taken before the nearest city court judge in
counties where city courts have been established."
First, in making a comparison and analysis of the
foregoing provisions with city court provisions, 78-5-1
above referring to justice courts has its counterpart in
78-4-10 as to City Counts:
78-4-10:
"Every judge of a city court shall reside in and
hold court in the city for which he is elected,
*

*

*

99

As to Section 77-57-2, obviously by its terms, it is
applicable only to matters commenced by a formal complainti "under oath" and does not cover either the nonwarrant arrest under 77-13-17, or a non-warrant arrest
followed by a ticket complaint not "under oath" under
41-6-166 and 41-6-167.
As to 78-4-16.5, by its own terms, it is limited to
Section 77-57-2 (formal complaint) proceedings and 7713-17 (non-warrant arrests under the criminal code) proceedings, and does not apply to non-warrant arrests and
ticket complaints under Section 41-6-166, 41-6-167 and
the Supreme Court rule on ticket complaint proceedings.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Section 78-4-16.5 allows an arresting officer to substitute the nearest city court for the nearest magistrate
in designated situations, but not including non-warrant
arrests under the Motor Vehicle Code for driving under
the influence of intoxicants.
The Court's ruling raises an interesting anomaly. In
the event the town justice has no criminal jurisdiction
outside the town, then the City Court of Logan has no
criminal jurisdiction outside Logan City (the exception
being those situations covered by 78-4-16.5), leaving only
the District Court to handle misdemeanor cases arising
in the County
The court cites 78-5-1 as restricting the town justice's
jurisdiction to the confines of the town itself.
But, Section 78-4-10 carries with it an identical provision applicable to City Courts.
Thus, if the language "shall reside in and shall hold
. . . court in the precinct, city or town for which he is
elected or appointed" contained in 78-5-1 is to be construed to limit the town justice's jurisdiction to the geographical area of his situs, the very same language in
78-4-10 referring to city courts would limit the jurisdiction of the city court to the geographical area of the city.
Plaintiff and Appellant emphasizes that Section 7757-2 applies only to "formal" ("under oath") complaints
and does not restrict the jurisdictional limits of justice
courts. Section 78-4-16.5 is applicable only to the situations therein described and does not expand the City
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Court jurisdiction in non-warrant traffic code arrests
with ticket complaints.
Switching to the positive approach, i.e., reasons in
support of Plaintiff's and Appellant's position that the
town justices have county wide jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses against the laws of the state, reference is
made to the following statutes:
78-5-5, U. C. A., 1953
78-5-4, U. C. A., 1953
78-5-5 gives town justices "the same powers and
jurisdictions as other justices of the peace in all other
actions, civil and criminal" (the first part gives them
exclusive jurisdiction over town ordinances),
78-5-4 defines the criminal jurisdiction of other justices. It provides:
"Justices' Courts have jurisdiction of the following public offenses committed within the
respective counties in which such courts are established:
.

.

•

(3) . . . all misdemeanors punishable by a fine
less than $300.00 or by imprisonment in the
county jail or municipal prison not exceeding
six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.5'
The legislative history of justice court jurisdiction
is spelled out by this Court in Dillard vs. District Court
of Salt Lake County, (1926), 69 U. 10, 251 Pac. 1070.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The legislative history shows that prior to 1925 the
Justices Courts were prescribed by Camp. Laws Utah
1917, Sec. 1784, which was identical to what is now 78-5-4,
and was county wide. The opinion may be concisely
stated as follows:
In 1925, the Legislature by chapter 62, Laws
of Utah 1952, passed on act entitled "An Act to
Amend Section 1784 . .." relating to the criminal
jurisdiction of justices' courts, wherein the jurisdiction was limited to the geographical limits
of the precinct.
Then, in 1951, the Legislature reverted back
to the pre 1925 law by enacting Section 78-5-4,
which is identical to the former Section 1784
giving county wide jurisdiction. In other words,
the legislature restored the law as it existed
prior to 1925.
Since Section 78-5-5 gives town justices the same
powers and jurisdictions as precinct justices, it seems
abundantly clear that the Wellsville Town Justice has
exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, as the nearest,
most accessible justice, and is the court before whom the
Plaintiff and Appellant should have been immediately
taken following his arrest.
The Court has recognized that the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace in criminal cases involving state
laws extends to the entire county.
Although the case of State vs. Town of Garland, 35
U. 426, 100 Pac. 934, involved a town ordinance this
court said relative to jurisdiction and state laws:
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"It is urged by Plaintiff's counsel, that, under
the general statutes of the state, the jurisdiction
of justices of the peace in criminal cases extends
to the entire county. This no doubt is true insofar as offenses against the laws of the state
are concerned, of which justices are given jurisdiction."
The Court went on to deal with jurisdiction over
violation of town ordinances, which matters are given
special treatment by the statutes.
From the very beginning, Plaintiff and Appellant
has objected to his case being processed in Logan City
Court. Under the rational of State vs. Johnson, (1941),
100 U. 316, 114 P. (2d) 1034, at 1042, Plaintiff and Appellant has the right to have his case proceed in the
proper forum as indicated in the Johnson case where the
Court states:
"It is a right personal to the Defendant to have
his cause tried in the Court of proper venue,
•

• •

The legislature, if it intended to restrict geographical jurisdiction, would have done so under the jurisdictional statute, 78-5-5, as it did in 1925, and not be defining where a formal Complaint should be filed, which
does not in any way involve the proceedings before us.
To follow the ruling of the lower court would be to
emasculate the jurisdiction of town justice courts, contrary to the intention of the legislature.
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CONCLUSION
There must be a reason why the legislature required
the officer to take the accused citizen "immediately" to
the "nearest or most accessible" magistrate.
Notwithstanding, the clear mandatory terms of the
statute, the officer and the lower courts ignored the legislative direction and substituted their own procedures.
A citizen is entitled to rely on the officer and on the
Courts, following the clearly-defined legislative directions.
Indeed ,in criminal matters where the officer and the
Court may deprive the citizen of his freedom and property, strict compliance with statutory mandates should
be required.
The statute selects "driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor" and "hit and run" as special crimes
and prescribes a "special procedure" in these cases. The
legislature demands special treatment and immediate
confrontation. The officer failed to follow the legislative
mandate, and the Court, even after the matter had been
brought to its attention, failed to comply with the clear
legal requirements.
The only Court having proper jurisdiction under the
statute is the Wellsville Justice Court, and, therefore,
all proceedings in the Logan City Court are a nullity.
The statute requires that the citizen be "immediately taken before a magistrate", and in this case the
citizen was not taken to a magistrate.
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In view of the complete failure of compliance with
both the statutory mandate requiring the citizen to be
taken to the nearest magistrate, and the mandate that
the confrontation be immediate, the Supreme Court
should make the Writ of Prohibition peremptory and
permanent.

Attorneys for Appellant
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